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Abstract 
Objectives - Board of Directors (BODs) and Shariah Supervisory Board (SSB) have a pivotal role to manage 
Islamic banks in Southeast Asia. The decision made by the BODs and SSB will directly affect to the risk-
taking behavior performed by Islamic bank. This study aims to investigate the relationship among BODs, SSB 
and risk-taking behavior of Islamic banks in Southeast Asia.  
Method - Adopting random effect model, unbalanced panel data, this research utilizes 24 Islamic banks in 
Southeast Asia which observe over six periods from 2009 to 2014.  
Results - the study reveals that independent director influences the risk-taking behavior positively, while 
Shariah Supervisory Board (SSB) affects it negatively. In addition, Board size has a positive effect on the 
credit risk but negative on z-score. 
Conclusion - Islamic bank industry in Southeast Asia has to consider to increase the number of SSB to 
oversee the Islamic bank operation appropriately. In addition, independent director composition in the board 
of directors has to be considered precisely in terms of the number to have a good performance in organizing 
the Islamic banks in Southeast Asia.   
Keywords: BODs, Independent director, SSB, Risk-taking behavior 
Abstrak 
Tujuan - Board of Directors (BODs) dan Dewan Pengawas Syariah (DPS) mempunyai peran penting dalam 
mengatur perbankan syariah di Asia Tenggara. Keputusan yang diambil oleh BODs dan DPS akan 
memberikan dampak secara langsung terhadap perilaku resiko yang dialami oleh perbankan syariah. 
Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk melakukan investigasi terhadap hubungan antara BODs, DPS dan perilaku 
resiko perbankan syariah di Asia Tenggara. 
Metodologi – Dengan menggunakan random effect model, menggunakan panel data yang tidak seimbang, 
penelitian ini menggunakan 24 perbankan syariah di Asia Tenggara yang diobservasi selama enam periode 
yakni pada tahun 2009-2014 
Hasil – Penelitian ini menemukan bahwa independent directors mempengaruhi perilaku resiko secara positif 
sementara itu DPS mempunyai hubungan yang negatif. Kemudian, jumlah BODs memiliki pengaruh positif 
terhadap resiko kredit tetapi berpengaruh negatif terhadap z-score. 
Kesimpulan – Industri perbankan syariah di Asia Tenggara sebaiknya harus mempertimbangkan kenaikan 
jumlah DPS untuk mengawasi kinerja perbankan syariah dengan baik. Selanjutnya, komposisi jumlah 
independent directors dalam BODs harus dipertimbangkan dengan tepat demi tercapainya kinerja yang 
optimal dalam mengatur perbankan syariah di Asia Tenggara.  
Kata Kunci : BODs, Independent Directors, DPS, Perilaku Resiko 
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1. Introduction 
Corporate governance issue becomes an important discussion in Islamic banking operation. One of 
the popular example is in Ihlas Finans House (IFH) which experienced financial distress during 
Turkey’s financial crisis in 2000-2001. The bank was liquidated due to a failure in corporate 
governance (Ali, 2007). This particular problem can be seen from the lack of internal checks and 
balances. It made the IFH had many shortcomings at motivating the board members, the decision 
making was too centralized, and the staff did not have a proper background in the industry. 
Moreover, it was also weakened by the board members which did not implement an appropriate 
policy based on financial and economic fact had by IFH, and the company failed to create system of 
internal control precisely.  
Then, multiplier effect happened as well due to the lack of corporate governance such as wrong 
decision in selecting the top management where senior executive was chosen from collapsed bank. 
That condition induced many mistakes in determining company strategy which was facing the 
financial crisis. At the end, IFH underwent financial difficulty like liquidity shortage, increase in 
non-performing loan, no efficient in management expense, having too higher asset usage ration and 
etc (Ali, 2007 ; Kanten & Ulker, 2013). The condition experienced by IFH illustrated that the bank 
did not have an appropriate risk management strategy in which there was no coordination to control 
the risk due to the worst financial and corporate governance performance.  
In another case, Bank Islam in Malaysia also had corporate governance issue in 2005 when the bank 
suffered from huge losses due to unexpected provision for non-performing financing. It makes the 
banks lost amounting to RM2.2 billion which 35% of the loss came from bank’s Labuan branch 
(Thajudeen, 2013). This situation occurred because Bank Islam was too generous at giving 
financing before calculating the risks, such as country risk and project risk. Moreover, internal 
control became main attention due to any ignorance at lending money to the companies which were 
no longer exist. The adversity faced by Bank Islam was caused by separation board and the 
management in headquarter office and Labuan Branch. What was happening to Bank Islam is barely 
tantamount to IFH which has higher risk creating financial difficulty caused by a lack of corporate 
governance. The mismatch management experienced by Bank Islam in Malaysia as well as IFH in 
Turkey give a big picture that corporate governance will relate to the Islamic bank performance 
directly. Based on the many circumstances confronted by the companies, it can be considered that 
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corporate governance is an urgency for the bank, especially Islamic bank, to manage the institution 
appropriately.  
Learning from those experience, ideally, Islamic banks must commit to perform profit loss sharing 
which eliminates riba, gharar and maysir (Sufian, 2007: Obaidullah, 2005). However, it has to be 
acknowledged that Islamic banks face the same risk as conventional banks. This situation is caused 
by the ecosystem of Islamic finance which remains to have strong relationship to conventional 
financial industry. For instance is inherent risk that consist of credit risk due to Islamic banks 
benchmark to profit still adopt interest rate such as KLIBOR in Malaysian case (Khan & Ahmed, 
2001). Another risk owned by Islamic bank are liquidity risk which relates to Islamic bank’s 
capability to fulfill their liability. 
Then, to perform Islamic bank properly, the bank needs a strong governance to manage the risks 
and to gain high return. A strong governance can be formed by putting the right people in the right 
position which can benefit to reduce agency cost as well. However, there are some issues which 
exist in corporate governance.  First issue is about the different orientation between shareholder and 
agent’s goal (Eisenhardt, 1989). The different goal between two parties may occur when the 
shareholders feel that what is being done by the board does not reflect the shareholder’s interest due 
to any different priority of the bank’s goal within each party. Second issue is about the difficulty to 
recognize what is actually the agent doing (Eisenhardt, 1989). Sometimes, the shareholders do not 
know about the activity done by the agent due to the complexity in the business process. Moreover, 
the possible discussion arising in that issue may be caused by moral hazard and lack of expertise 
performed by the agent. 
In Islamic banks’ governance, Board of Directors (BODs) composition consist of independent 
directors, non-independent directors and Shariah Supervisory Board (SSB). Both of directors’ type 
are appointed by shareholders in general meeting. Especially for independent directors, this kind of 
directors comes from outsiders which have expertise in certain field needed by the company. It may 
be based on their experience or knowledge. The independent directors will have a role as guardians 
for the company to make it performs better. they can also be a buffer for non-independent directors 
when they discuss with shareholders (Pass, 2004). Moreover, independent directors will give more 
value to the company due to a symbol of professionalism and transparency. In addition, board size 
may also affect to risk taking behavior of Islamic banks. Theoretically, by having too much board, 
the performance of the board will not perform well (Belkhir, 2009). 
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Furthermore, SSB is responsible to manage the Islamic bank to comply with shariah. SSB also 
deserves to consider the acceptance of Islamic products’ structure in terms of shariah view before 
the product is issued to the market. In reviewing the products, SSB as a representative of Islamic 
banks must have forward-looking basis to determine the decision (IFSB, 2014). Eventually, after 
reviewing the product before issued to the customers, SSB will make some recommendations to the 
Islamic banks independently (Hamza, 2013). 
Focusing to the relationship between good corporate governance and its influence to risk-taking 
behavior as well as the performance of Islamic banks, there are several studies which discuss that 
related issues. In the conventional perspective, Rachdi, Trabalesi and Trad (2013) studied about the 
banking governance related to the risk owned by the banks in Tunisian banks context by using 
Generalized Least Square (GLS) random effect. The finding of the research is that the board size 
and bank size are negatively significant to the z-score and credit risk respectively. It means that the 
small banks and duality board are attributed to have more insolvency risk in business activity 
performed by the banks. In addition, global risk increases while independent board exists in the 
BODs.  
Wang (2011), Suu and Lee (2012) conducted the research in the same issue which concluded that 
the structure of BODs affects to risk-taking behavior and the company performance. In terms of 
banking performance, Belkir (2009) found that independent directors do not have significant 
relationship to the performance. Then bank size is negatively significant to the performance as well 
while the total asset negatively significant to all samples (Belkhir, 2009).  However, the board size 
has positive relationship to the performance especially in saving-and-loan. Furthermore, pertaining 
with risk-taking done by board of directors conducted by Pathan (2009), it is found that there is a 
relationship between board of directors and the bank decision in terms of risk-taking behavior 
(Pathan, 2009) 
Narrowing to the Islamic bank context, Bukhair and Rahman (2015) tried to examine the the 
relationship between BODs mechanism, investment account holder and social contribution on the 
banks performance during 2008-2011. Furthermore, the study showed that bank size is negatively 
significant to the perfomance as well as non executive board. In addition, separation between CEO 
and the chairman has negatively significant as well. It is different from non-executive chairman that 
has positively significant effect to the performance of Islamic banks. Other variables such as 
investment account holders and zakat do not have significant effect to the performance of Islamic 
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banks. Based on the result of the analysis, it can be seen that Islamic banks have different type from 
conventional banks where it can be concluded that corporate mechanism of BODs, ownership 
structure and social contribution do not influence Islamic banks performance (Bukhair & Rahman, 
2015). 
Study conducted by Mollah and Zaman (2015) tried to specify the shariah supervision towards 
Islamic banks’ performance. This study attempt to delineate the role of shariah supervision, board 
structure and CEO-power in affecting banks’ performance. By having 1204 bank-year observation, 
it results that shariah supervisory board coefficient positively affects the bank performance even 
though it is not significant. Like the previous research, independent board, CEO power and the 
board composition evidance to have negatively significant to the performance. Afterwards, the role 
of SSB as supervisory board has positive relationship that is different from when SSB funcionates 
as advisory board which is negatively insignificant (Mollah & Zaman, 2015) 
Based on the existing previous researches, it is able to be captured that most of the researchers 
apply conventional institutions as the object of the study. Although Bukhair and Rahman (2015) and 
Mollah and Zaman (2015) utilized Islamic banks as the object of their study, they only concern on 
investigating the impact of board structure and its mechanism to Islamic banks’ return. The 
performance of Shariah Supervisory Board (SSB) is also portrayed in Mollah and Zaman’s study 
but it is only descriptive explanation which does not statistically relate to Islamic banks’ return. 
Therefore, to the best of our knowledge, the empirical research about the relationship between 
Islamic banks performance and the risk-taking behavior do not exist yet and then it is necessary to 
be given a serious attention to capture comprehensive condition in regard to what is happening in 
current Islamic banks. 
Hence, it will be interesting to analyze board of directors, SSB and the risk-taking behavior of 
Islamic banks which it will give the new point of view in this area due to the lack of literature 
discussing about this topic. This paper will explore the recommendation to the stakeholders of 
Islamic banks to improve its business operation. Regarding to the structure of this paper, the second 
part of this paper will shed light methodology. Thirdly, it will explain about result and finding 
where the conclusion and recommendation will be the last part of this paper. 
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2. Methodology 
2.1.  Data and Variable 
This study attempts to investigate the relationship among BODs, SSB and risk-taking behavior of 
Islamic banks in Southeast Asia. Based on the Ernest and Young Report (2016), it delineates that 
Southeast Asia is one of the regions that have the highest Islamic banks’ market share in the world 
as well as the highest asset and growth. Thus, this research concerns in that regions which are 
considered as the central of Islamic banking in the world. Moreover, all Islamic banks in Southeast 
Asia are taken as the sample of the study for each region. The reason of taking all Islamic banks as 
the sample of the study is to reveal the finding of the study holistically. However, only Islamic 
banks which have a good disclosure in their financial report will be taken as the sample of the study. 
The openness of the financial report comprises of several data needed in this research such as the 
board of director’s size, the independent directors, shariah board, non-performing loan, equity ratio 
and total asset. Then, by having total sample amounting 24 Islamic banks consisting 140 Islamic 
bank-year observation period, this research collects the data from Bank-scope Bureau Van Dijk and 
Islamic bank’s websites to yield the financial reports in detail. Moreover, the data use sixth year 
period starting from 2009-2014 which the consideration to take that period is that the data or 
financial performance of Islamic banks are more stable after financial crisis in 2008.  
2.2.  Variable Definition 
In terms of variable used, this research uses several variables which consist of dependent variable, 
independent variable and control variable. Bank risk-taking is utilized as dependent variable that 
has proxy of bankruptcy risk (Z-Score) and credit risk (CR). The Z-score delineates the risk to 
bankrupt whereby the higher the score of z-score, the less exposure owned by the Islamic bank 
towards bankruptcy risk.  Then, the credit risk assesses the capability of the bank to manage its 
financing process. Moreover, board size (Bodsize), board independence (Ind) and size of shariah 
committee (SizeSSB) are taken as the independent variable. All of the variables mentioned before 
as the proxy of shariah governance of Islamic bank. Shariah governance captures the system owned 
by the bank to manage its operation. Then, capital ratio (ETA) and the company size (TA) are used 
as the control variable.  The measurement of the variable is explained in the Tabel 1.  
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Table 1. Variable Measurement 
Variable Name Measurement 
Bankruptcy Risk (Z-
Score) 
The mean return on assets plus the capital asset ratio (equity/total 
assets) divided by the standard deviation of asset return 
Credit risk (CR) The ratio of non-performing financing and advances to total 
financing and advances 
Board Size (Bodsize) The number of directors on the board 
Independent Director 
(Ind) 
The number of independent director on the board 
Size of shariah 
committee (SizeSSB) 
The number of Shariah Supervisory Board 
Capital Ratio  
(ETA) 
The ratio between equity and total asset (Equity Ratio = E/TS) 
Company Size (TA) The number of total asset 
 
2.3.  Method 
Panel data comprises of time and place which are able to measure some quantity of the phenomenon 
in certain period of time (Brooks, 2008). Panel data allows the study to have heterogeneity 
explicitly to pool the data. In this view, the data actually may consist of firm, states, countries and 
etc. which is treated as an individual in panel data (Gujarati, 2004) because it has an assumption that 
every individual have the similar response when it faces the same condition. Those assumption 
affects the sample size which increase bigger and there is no issue to have bias data in single 
individual regression (Asteriou and Hall, 2011). Second, panel data will give more comprehensive 
view about the data because it can capture dynamic of change of the study’s object. Third, if there is 
poor cross section and time series data, panel data can be used to assess the research condition 
which may not be able to be conducted by the other types of data. Fourth, panel data can reduce the 
bias when it has thousand units of data which create broad aggregate among or between the firms or 
individual that is being observed (Gujarati, 2004). 
The methodology used to analyze the data in this study is random-effect Generalize Least Square 
(GLS). Conceptually, random effect method is different from fixed effect method where random 
effect does not treat the dummy variable to be constant but let it moves randomly (Asteriou and 
Hall, 2011). Due to that concept, the variability comes from:  
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   can be defined as zero mean in standard random variable. Thus, in the random effect equation, it 
is able to make some adjustment based on the equation abovementioned which is from  
    (      )                              
It is adjusted into 
                               (      ) 
In addition, there are several reasons why it is chosen which is first, Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
does not consider panel data structure. Second, it is the nature of the data such as independent 
director and board size which do not have high variation which will make massive degree of the 
freedom’s losses if fixed effect method is applied in the model (Mollah & Zaman, 2015). Moreover, 
GLS random effect also applied by Pathan (2009) where the robustness of the method will address 
cross-sectional correlation and heteroskedasticity especially for unbalanced data.  
Furthermore, in this paper, the main model consists of one dependent variable. The model 
performed in this paper is formulated as a follow;  
                      (       )                                (  )             
                           
In this model, i denotes for Islamic banks where i = 2009, 2010, 2011. . . 2014 and t portrays as 
period which is t = 1, 2, 3. . . 140. 
3. Result and Finding 
3.1.  Descriptive Data  
Table 2. Descriptive Data of Islamic Banks in Southeast Asia 
 Mean Std.Dev Min Max 
Zscore 46.44501 49.44223 5.312904 349.1389 
CR 2.822429 2.97659 0 23.23 
Bodsize 5.728571 2.281748 2 10 
Ind 3.028571 1.174935 1 6 
SizeSSB 3.807143 1.382816 2 9 
TA 4012.138 6109.311 17.16019 41838.05 
ETA 12.1503 11.93117 3.19 93.13884 
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According to the Table 2, it explains the description of the data in the variables used in this 
research. In the credit risk view, the lowest number is 0% meaning that the Islamic banks do not 
have risk when they give financing to the customers in the certain time within the period of study. 
On the other hand, the highest number of credit risk reaches 23.23% which it explains that the 
related Islamic banks in Southeast Asia suffers high loss in financing activity. Averagely, the credit 
risk of Islamic banks is quite low which only reach 2.823%. Then, z-score describing the 
bankruptcy risk reveals that the maximum and minimum value are 349.1389 and 5.312904 
respectively. 
In the board of directors’ nature, the number of board size in Islamic banks is actually not the same. 
The number of BODs is 5 which consists 3 independent directors and the the others are non-
independent directors. In terms of BODs’ structure, commonly the number of independent director 
is more than 3 people. In addition, the number of independent director is at least one person in each 
Islamic bank where the maximum number of independent director is 6 people. Afterwards, the SSB 
Size reveals that actually Islamic bank has at least 2 people in shariah committee, vice versa. 
Islamic bank has large number of SSB amounting to 9 members although commonly the number of 
SSB in the bank is around 4 shariah scholars. The number of board size, independent director and 
SSB also sheds light the Islamic bank condition in performing corporate governance.  
Surprisingly, there is a big gap amongst Islamic bank in terms of the number of the asset. It is 
evidenced by the minimum amount of asset reaching USD 17.16 million owning by the smallest 
Islamic bank based on asset in this sample of the study. Afterwards, the asset number had by the 
biggest Islamic bank touches USD 41,838.05 million where the average of the bank size is USD 
4,012.138 million. It also portrays that the different scale of bank size also emerges in Islamic bank. 
Then, the equity ratio of Islamic bank which explains the percentage of the equity on the total asset 
averagely has 12.15%. Moreover, the smallest number of equity ratio reaches 3.19 while the highest 
number is 93.14%. The different number of the equity ratio surely makes the different risk that 
Islamic bank will face.   
  
Tazkia Islamic Finance and Business Review 
Volume 10.2 
 
171 
 
3.2. Correlation in the variable 
Table 3. Correlation Test  
 Zscore CR Ind Lnbodsize SizeSSB LnTA ETA 
Zscore 1.0000       
CR -0.1646 1.0000      
Ind 0.0398 0.1593 1.0000     
LnBodsize -0.1870 0.1464 0.7155 1.0000    
SizeSSB -0.2190 -0.0201 0.4861 0.5909 1.0000   
LnTA -0.2529 0.1087 0.4490 0.4788 0.6967 1.0000  
ETA 0.2492 -0.0489 -0.3459 -0.3671 -0.4064 -0.6611 1.0000 
 
Correlation test aims to understand the relationship between one variable to another variable at 
which it is determined by the number of correlation based one the result of test conducted in the 
Table 3. Table 3 shows that the independent director has positive correlation to the z-score which is 
the same as the correlation to the credit risk. It can be interpreted that if the number of independent 
director increases, the risk faced by the company also increases. On the other hands, the board size 
has different correlation to each proxy of risk-taking behavior owned by the Islamic bank. For z-
score variable, the board size negatively correlates to the risk although it has positive correlation to 
the credit risk. It represents that if the number of the board is higher, the z-score value will be lower, 
conversely the credit risk will be higher following the positive direction between the variables.  
The correlation owned by the number Shariah Supervisory Board (Size SSB) is the same as z-score 
and credit risk which is negatively correlated. This direction implies that when the number of SSB 
is high, the risk faced by the company will be less than having less number of shariah scholar sitting 
in the board. Furthermore, the larger Islamic bank based on total asset will tend to have higher 
credit risk even though the z-score seems to be lower. This circumstance is indicated by the 
negative and positive correlation had by total asset variable to z-score and credit risk respectively. 
The inverse correlation is owned by capital ratio of Islamic bank that is measured by using equity 
divided by total asset. According to the correlation’s in the Table 3, it exhibits that capital ratio will 
affect the z-score negatively while the credit ratio will be influenced conversely. It connotes that 
while Islamic bank has the higher number of equity used as capital, it will decrease the credit risk 
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but increase z-score. The latter, it also explains that there is no multicollinearity issue evidenced by 
all correlation values which do not exceed 0.8. 
3.3.  Random Effect Analysis 
To determine the random effect analysis, Hausman-test has to be applied to decide whether the 
random effect analysis is appropriate or not. Then in the Hausman-test, the z-score as dependent 
variable appoints that the number of p-value is more than 0.05 which represents that Ho is accepted. 
While, the credit risk is applied as dependent variable, the p-value of Hausman-test also portrays the 
same result which is more than 0.05. Thus, the conclusion of the result decides to accept random 
effect analysis (HO) as the method to be used in this test.  
Tabel 4. Random Effect Test (Z-Score) 
Z-score 1 2 3 4 5 
Ind 1.900942  1.683207 1.925893  
 (0.359)  (0.346) (0.352)  
InBodsize -1.819334 2.634635  -2.244996 2.275095 
 (0.847) (0.747)  (0.811) (0.779) 
SizeSSB -.7497405 -.7444717 -.7728109   
 (0.691) (0.689) (0.678)   
LnTA -5.75843 -5.162653 -5.717073 -6.417626*** -5.814829*** 
 (0.134) (0.171) (0.135) (0.064) (0.087) 
ETA .8673277* .9006307* .8754319* .841337* .8750681* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
C 80.28142** 73.78719 77.62061* 83.31371* 76.7479** 
 (0.014) (0.021)** (0.009) (0.008) (0.014) 
      
Pooled 
Observation 
 
140 
 
140 
 
140 
 
140 
 
140 
R square 0.0904 0.0745 0.0874 0.0892 0.0733 
Wald Chi2 38.88* 38.83* 39.44* 38.79* 38.75 
Robustness standard is in 1%(*), 5%(**) and 10%(***) 
Table 4 shows the result of random effect analysis which test all variables. It displays the number of 
observations in the model one to five which has 140 bank-year observation. Afterwards, R-square 
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explains that the independent variable is able to explain 9.04% of dependent variable in the model 
one at which the number of percentage will be less than it for other models beside model one. In 
terms of Wald Chi2, all models exhibit that it is significant at 1% level. It also shows that the 
provided model in this analysis is good. From the result of the analysis partially, the board size 
affects negatively to the z-score value. This result is in line with the study conducted by Wang 
(2011) who confirms that  the higher number of people sitting in the board, the lower the risk will 
be.This relationship is also had by  the SSB size which represents that SSB does not have 
significant effect to the Islamic banks which is also supported by Mollah and Zaman (2015).  
In the SSB variable, the number of coefficient reaches -0.7497505 which indicates that if the SSB 
variable increase 1%, the z-score will decrease 0.7497505%. However, the independent director has 
positive relationship to the risk-taking behavior in all conditions in the five various models in the 
Table 3. It also explains that independent director tends to be risk-taker in operating Islamic banks. 
Then, in terms of coefficient value, it can be interpreted that if the value of independent director 
increase amounting 1%, the z-score will increase 1.900942%. Uniquely, the board size changes to 
affect the risk positively if the independent director is not included in the model. It may be a signal 
to the corporate governance management where the BODs tend to be risk averse in managing the 
risk when the independent director is in the risk taker position to maximize the stakeholders wealth. 
Moreover, board of directors prefers to take more risk when there is no independent director even 
though in the same time, SSB may commit not to take more risk consistently in all models.   
Furthermore, there is no significant effect from the board of directors’ element at all models. 
Otherwise, only capital ratio influences z-score positively significant. It connotes that if the 
percentage of equity to total asset is higher, the Islamic bank tends to engage in the riskier business 
activity. The size of Islamic bank influences negatively to the risk but only significant while the 
SSB is not included in the model. It indicates that SSB has a pivotal role in manage the Islamic 
bank’s risk where the banks have higher size opts to have less risk in operating the Islamic bank’s 
business activity. 
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Tabel 5. Random Effect Test (Credit Risk) 
CR 1 2 3 4 5 
Ind .2145033  .2364956 .2151646  
 (0.382)  (0.263) (0.384)  
InBodsize .1705669 .6313548  -.0771203 .379951 
 (0.866) (0.466)  (0.939) (0.659) 
SizeSSB -.402823*** -.4050127*** -.3984113***   
 (0.071) (0.070) (0.071)   
LnTA -.0036302 .0550038 .004839 -.3269155 -.2690963 
 (0.993) (0.886) (0.990) (0.350) (0.433) 
ETA -.0238185 -.0207093 -.0240775 -.0358171 -.0327196 
 (0.389) (0.451) (0.378) (0.186) (0.224) 
C 3.713954 3.132167 3.85229 5.158355*** 4.582618 
 (0.227) (0.297) (0.172) (0.084) (0.116) 
      
Pooled 
Observation 
 
140 
 
140 
 
140 
 
140 
 
140 
R-square 0.0239 0.0261 0.0205 0.0003 0.0086 
Wald Chi2 5.84 5.07 5.83 2.53 1.13 
Robustness standard is in 1%(*), 5%(**) and 10%(***) 
In the Table 5, generally, some variables have different influence when the dependent is changed by 
credit risk. In this particular model, independent director has the same influence as the prior model 
which affects positively to the risk. It can be interpreted that the higher number of independent 
director will make the Islamic bank tends to engage in higher risk activity (Pathan, 2009). The 
influence of independent director can also be seen from the value of coefficient which is equal to 
0.2145033 meaning that when the independent director increases its influence worth of 1%, the 
credit risk will rise to 0.2145033%. After that, SSB also has a consistent direction to the dependent 
variable which is negatively significant to the risk-taking behavior done by the Islamic banks. It 
also delineates the same reason at which SBB opts not to engage in excess risk business activity. 
The significant influence had by SSB also argued by Mollah and Zaman’s (2015) opinion which 
stated that SSB does not have significant influence. Nonetheless, inconsistent relationship is 
exhibited by board size that will affect differently in different condition. The board of directors will 
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have to select high risk activity when the independent director and SSB are involved in the model. 
Moreover, this condition also occurs when the board of directors only governs the Islamic bank by 
itself. Conversely, board of directors tends to be risk averse when the board’s member only 
collaborates with independent director and SSB does not engage in corporate governance 
management.  
This phenomenon indicates that the higher number of board of directors’ behavior will depend on 
the condition of the governance structure while the independent director and SBB is in the same 
role consistently in every model of governance. In addition, the big size of Islamic bank will take 
less risk than the smaller one. It is displayed by the negative effect had by the total asset to the 
credit risk. For the equity ratio variable, generally it will have negative effect to the risk which 
means  that Islamic bank which owns the higher number of equity will have less credit risk in 
operating business activity. Nevertheless, from all influences had by the variables explained above, 
only SSB that has significant effect to the credit risk. 
4. Conclusion and Recommendation 
This article reveals the influence of board of directors’ nature in terms of size, independent director 
and Shariah Supervisory Board (SSB) to the risk-taking behavior owned by Islamic Banks in 
Southeast Asia. From the finding, it explains that independent director will affect positively to the 
risk-taking behavior. It also sheds light that independent director becomes risk-taker in the board 
director’s composition. Inversely, SSB is consistent to supervise the Islamic bank operation which 
is not to have excess risk in managing the bank as displayed by the negative relationship to the risk 
in the analysis’s result mentioned above. This particular condition also delineates that the more 
shariah scholar sitting in the SSB, the more strict supervision role will be. However, the board size 
gives different direction in terms of the relation amongst variables in the model where it has 
positive effect to the credit risk and negative influence to z-score. It exhibits that if the board of 
directors has a big number, the credit risk will be higher, while it will reduce the z-score value.  It 
means that the bank tends to have more exposure to the credit risk and bankruptcy risk. Based on 
the finding, this study suggests that the Islamic bank industry in Southeast Asia has to consider to 
increase the number of SSB to oversee the Islamic bank operation appropriately. In addition, 
independent director composition in the board of directors has to be considered precisely in terms of 
the number to have a good performance in organizing the Islamic banks in Southeast Asia.  
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